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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Ronald Lee Macik appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his untimely petition for post-conviction relief, filed nearly 40 years 
after he pied guilty to first-degree murder. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On August 31, 1972, Macik pied guilty to first-degree murder, and, on 
September 14, 1972, the court imposed a life sentence. (R., p.29.) "Macik 
evidently did not appeal, or any appeal that he filed was dismissed, [as there is] 
no record of an appeal in his case other than the appeal of his co-defendant, 
Danny Powers." State v. Macik, Docket No. 39233, 2012 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 491 (Idaho App. May 24, 2012). 1 
"On March 14, 2011, Macik wrote a letter to the district court which was 
treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and counsel was appointed to 
represent him." Macik at p.1. 'The district court denied Macik's motion upon 
concluding that the court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his 
claim." JsL The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: "It is apparent that the district 
court did not possess jurisdiction to grant Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea more than thirty-eight years after judgment was entered. Therefore, the 
1 The district court took judicial notice of "the underlying record, in Case No. CR-
FE-1971-000949 (formerly Case No. Cr. 4949)" and the Court of Appeals' 
opinion "remitted" on June 28, 2012. (R., p.21.) A copy of the Court of Appeals' 
2012 opinion in Macik is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
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district court's order denying Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is 
affirmed." kl at p.2. 
On July 26, 2012, two months after the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
denial of Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Macik filed a pro se petition 
for post-conviction relief alleging (1) a court-ordered mental evaluation report was 
withheld from the defense; (2) a "violation of [his] Miranda rights"; and (3) his 
guilty plea was coerced. (R., pp.3-4.) Macik also alleged counsel was not 
present at his change of plea hearing, he did not receive "a record of any 
proceeding in CR-4949 until May 27, 2009," "another inmate confessed to 
committing the murder" and he "did not have a clear or sound mind." (R., p.5.) 
Macik also filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the district court 
denied upon concluding "Macik's post-conviction claims are untimely." (R., 
pp.10-13, 23.) More specifically, the court noted Macik "fail[ed] to allege anything 
that raises the possibility of valid claims" since all of Macik's claims relate to his 
"entry of plea on August 31, 1972, or potential suppression issues" and "do not 
relate to his Motion to Withdraw Plea filed March 17, 2011, thirty-eight and one-
half (38½) years after pleading guilty, which th[e] Court denied on September 8, 
2011." (R., pp.23-24 (emphasis original).) 
On August 22, 2012, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal, 
asserting that "although [Macik] did file a substantive motion in 2011, the matters 
in the Uniform Post-Conviction petition address proceedings that occurred in 
1971-1972. Accordingly, the petition is well outside the one-year time limit 
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established in I.C. 19-4902." (R., pp.26-27.) The district court entered an order 
dismissing Macik's petition on August 27, 2012. (R., pp.29-32.) 
Two days later, Macik filed a "Motion for Leave to Amend," arguing 
(verbatim): 
The Petitioner was granted permission to file a direct appeal 
on His conviction by the Idaho Court's of Appeals, and that direct 
appeal was denied. Petition now seeks to file an original Post-
Conviction Petition as provided by law, upon his conviction based 
on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and other 
matters, which will be more defined in an amended petition. 
Petitioner originally predicated that counsel would be appointed and 
his counsel would amend the petition according to prerequisites of 
the Court. However, counsel has been denied and Petition must 
now conform his Petition without the benefit of counsel, and prays 
this Honorable Court will permit Petitioner the right pursuant to the 
Act, to amend His petition before dismissal so that proper evidence 
and allegations can be submitted for the courts review, as counsel 
is not available to do so. 
The Petitioner requests permIssIon to file documents, 
affidavit's, transcripts, and other material evidence in support of His 
claims. He is unschooled in the law, has limited resources and it 
would be a manifest injustice to determine the merits of his claims 
without giving Him the opportunity to amend pursuant to statutory 
mandate. 
(R., pp.33-34.) 
The court denied Macik's motion because Macik failed to "present any 
good cause as to why any new claims exist that could not have been included in 
the Petition" and because Macik failed to "identify what, if any, new claims he 
might have." (R., p.36.) The court also reiterated that Macik's "underlying 
criminal case is nearly forty (40) years old." (Id.) 
The court entered judgment on August 30, 2012, from which Macik filed a 
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.38-43.) 
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ISSUE 
Macik states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Macik's post-
conviction petition without providing him twenty days to respond to 
the State's motion to dismiss? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Macik failed to show reversible error in the summary dismissal of his 
untimely post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Macik Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal Of 
His Untimely Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Macik asserts the district court erred when it dismissed his petition 
because the court did not give him 20 days to respond to the state's motion for 
summary dismissal. (Appellant's Brief, p.3.) Although Macik is correct in his 
assertion that the district court dismissed his petition without giving him 20 days 
to respond to the state's motion for summary dismissal, the Court should find the 
error harmless in this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Macik Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Summary Dismissal Of 
His Untimely Petition 
"Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) permits either party in a post-conviction relief 
proceeding to file a motion for summary disposition of the application." DeRushe 
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009). Although the district 
court is not required to provide a 20-day notice prior to granting a state's motion 
for summary dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a "like twenty day 
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period of time shall be allowed" to respond to the state's motion. State v. 
Christensen, 102 Idaho 487,489,632 P.2d 676,678 (1981); also Saykhamchone 
v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995) ("After the state files a 
subsection (c) motion, a petitioner is still entitled to twenty days to respond, so as 
to afford an opportunity to establish a material fact issue."). Although the district 
court dismissed Macik's petition before the 20-day period expired, the Court 
should find the error harmless in this case. 
Post-conviction relief proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150 (citing Stuart v. 
State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); I.C. § 19-4907(a)). Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states, in relevant part: "The court at every stage of 
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
"Prior to 1979, applications for post-conviction relief could be filed at any 
time." LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 388, 807 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In 
1979, the legislature amended I.C. § 19-4902 to impose a five-year statute of 
limitation, and the Court of Appeals "ruled that the five-year statute of limitation 
applies to applications for relief from convictions entered before 1979." .lit "In 
such cases, the five-year limitation period began to run on July 1, 1979, the 
effective date of the amendment."2 .lit at 389, 807 P.2d at 68 (citation omitted). 
Thus, Macik had until July 1, 1984, to file his post-conviction petition. Macik did 
not, however, file his petition until 28 years later. (R., p.3.) 
2 Idaho Code Section 19-4902 has since been amended and now provides for a 
one-year limitation period. 
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The failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for 
dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-191, 30 P.3d 
967, 968-969 (2001 ). However, "[i]n Idaho, equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitation for filing a post-conviction petition has been recognized" in two 
circumstances: (1) "where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state 
facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho 
legal materials;" and (2) "where mental disease and/or psychotropic medication 
renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing 
challenges to his conviction." Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190, 219 P.3d 
1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 
Nowhere in his petition or supporting affidavit does Macik explain why his 
petition was not filed until decades after he pied guilty. (See generally R., pp.3-
9.) Nor did Macik provide any explanation in his Motion for Leave to Amend. 
(See generally R., pp.33-34.) Macik correctly notes that, in his petition and 
affidavit, he asserted he was on Thorazine. (Appellant's Brief, p.4; R., pp.4, 8.) 
Macik, however, also acknowledges "those facts alone would not necessarily 
establish a justification for equitable tolling," but claims, "if provided the 
opportunity, [he] could have established that his mental incapacity persisted to 
the date he filed his post-conviction petition." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Contrary to 
Macik's suggestion on appeal, he was not deprived of that opportunity. 
While Macik was not required to allege in his petition the reasons he failed 
to comply with the statute of limitation and why he should be entitled to tolling, 
the court's order denying his request for counsel put him on notice that his 
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petition failed to state the possibility of a valid claim because all of the claims 
were untimely. Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 792, 992 P.2d 783, 787 (Ct. 
App. 1999) ("Although it would be prudent for an applicant to allege facts which 
he contends would avoid the time bar when an application is filed outside the 
one-year period specified in § 19-4902, the absence of such allegations in the 
initial pleading is not fatal to an applicant's claims.") Macik subsequently filed his 
Motion for Leave to Amend, acknowledging that the court denied his request for 
counsel and requesting leave amend his petition to provide "proper evidence and 
allegations" including affidavits, transcripts, "and other material evidence in 
support of His [sic] claims." (R., p.34 (emphasis added).) Despite the 
opportunity to address the court's finding that his petition was untimely, Macik 
said nothing about how he could overcome this procedural hurdle. Instead, 
Macik essentially asked the court to provide him additional time to provide 
evidence to support his claims. 
Further, it should be noted that Macik's references to Thorazine were not 
made in the context of any request for tolling, nor did he allege that he has been 
on Thorazine for the past 40 years. (See generally R., pp.4, 8.) What Macik 
alleged was that he was placed on Thorazine on October 1, 1969, when he was 
"committed to" prison and was "required to take [it] three times daily before 
during and after [his] trial essentially causing [him] to be a mere spetator [sic] at 
[his] own trial incapable of any rational thought [and] abandoned by [his] 
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assigned attorney and forced to plead." (R., p.8 (punctuation original).)3 Macik's 
assertion that he "could have established that his mental incapacity persisted to 
the date he filed his post-conviction petition" if he had been "provided the 
opportunity" is not only speculative, it is inconsistent with the record as Macik's 
petition and affidavit do not suggest that he was prevented from filing a petition 
due to Thorazine and he was able to file a responsive pleading with the court, but 
failed to address the critical defect in his petition. Cf. Anderson, 133 Idaho at 
793, 992 P.2d at 788 ("In this case, Anderson did not respond to the State's 
motion with an affidavit or other documentary evidence of facts that would toll the 
statute of limitations."). 
Because Macik did not file his post-conviction petition until nearly 40 years 
after he pied guilty and 28 years after the statute of limitation expired, and given 
that he had an opportunity, before judgment was entered, to provide the district 
court with evidence that he should be entitled to tolling for the enormous delay 
beyond the five-year statute of limitation, the Court should find the failure to 
afford Macik 20 days in which to respond to the state's motion harmless. 
3 Although Macik does not assert it as a potential basis for tolling, Macik also 
alleged in his petition that he was transferred to a "Federal Prison at Lewisburg 
PA" on "Dec 1s1 1972." (R., p.8.) As with Macik's Thorazine-based incompetence 
argument, Macik made no connection between his transfer and his ability to file a 
post-conviction petition. Indeed, Macik acknowledges in his affidavit that he was 
able to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in 2011 at which time he was 
represented by the Ada County Public Defender. (R., p.8.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Macik's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 11 th day of June 2013. 
ty Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, District Judge. 
Order denying motion to withdraw guilty plea, affirmed. 
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LANSING, Judge 
Ronald L. Macik appeals from the district court's denial of Macik's motion for 
withdrawal of his guilty plea, which was filed more than thirty-eight years after entry of his 
judgment of conviction. 
On September 14, 1972, Macik was convicted of first degree murder on his plea of guilty. 
He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Macik evidently did not appeal, or any appeal 
that he filed was dismissed, for we find no record of an appeal in his case other than the appeal 
of his co-defendant, Danny Powers. On March 14, 2011, Macik wrote a letter to the district 
court which was treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and counsel was appointed to 
represent him. The district court denied Macik's motion upon concluding that the court was 
without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claim. 
Although "[m]indful of State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352,355, [79 P.3d 711, 714] (2003)," 
in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that a trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain a 
1 
motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after the judgment in the criminal case has become final, 
Macik nevertheless appeals. In Jakoski, the Supreme Court stated, "Absent a statute or rule 
extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires 
once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the 
judgment on appeal." Id. at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c), which authorizes 
motions to withdraw guilty pleas, "does not include any provision extending the jurisdiction of 
the trial court for the purpose of hearing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea." Id. Consequently, 
a trial court possesses no jurisdiction to consider a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after 
the judgment of conviction has become final. This absence of jurisdiction precludes 
consideration of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "irrespective of the merits" of the 
defendant's claim. State v. Wegner, 148 Idaho 270,272,220 P.3d 1089, 1091 (2009). 
It is apparent that the district court did not possess jurisdiction to grant Macik' s motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea more than thirty-eight years after judgment was entered. Therefore, the 
district court's order denying Macik's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is affirmed. 
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR. 
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